The Root Stanzas of the Middle Way Read online

  How could these not be nonconditions?

  6

  For nonexistent and existent things,

  Conditions are not relevant.

  If things do not exist, of what could these conditions be?

  If they exist, what would conditions do?

  7

  When a thing is not produced

  Whether as existent or as nonexistent or as both together,

  How can there be talk of its productive causes?

  If such there are, they are illogical.

  8

  Object-conditions of existing entities,

  It has been taught, are simply nonexistent.

  And if no entities are found,

  Object-conditions—how could they exist?

  9

  If things are unproduced,

  Cessation [of their cause] is inadmissible.

  “Immediately preceding” therefore is absurd,

  And if [the cause] does cease, what condition could it be?

  10

  If things without intrinsic being

  Are, for that very reason, nonexistent,

  It makes no sense to say

  That “when this is, that too arises.”

  11

  In conditions, single or together,

  The effect is not at all existent.

  Something that is not in its conditions—

  How, from such conditions, could it be produced?

  12

  But if effects result from such conditions

  Even though in them they don’t exist,

  Why should effects not also come

  From what are not conditions for them?

  13

  Even if effects possess the nature of conditions,

  Conditions lack their own intrinsic being.

  How can effects produced from what has no intrinsic being

  Have the nature of conditions?

  14

  And so effects do not possess

  The nature of conditions or of nonconditions.

  Since effects have no existence, what conditions

  And what nonconditions could there be for them?

  2

  An Examination of Motion

  There is no motion in the having gone

  And in the not yet gone, there is no motion.

  Apart from “has gone” and “has not yet gone,”

  The “act of going” is not known.

  2

  “Where there’s an act of moving,” you may say, “it’s there that motion is.

  And this is found in someone’s act of going.

  It’s not in what has gone; it’s not in what has not yet gone.

  Motion, thus, is in the act of going.”

  3

  How is it acceptable to say

  That motion is within the act of going?

  For when there is no motion,

  The act of going is untenable.

  4

  For those who say

  That motion is within the act of going,

  It follows that this act of going is motionless.

  For motion is within the act of going.

  5

  If motion is within the act of going,

  It follows that there are two motions:

  The motion thanks to which there is the act of going

  And the motion that is in it.

  6

  If it follows that there are two motions,

  There are perforce two moving bodies.

  For without a moving body,

  Motion is untenable.

  7

  If without a moving body,

  Motion is untenable,

  How, when there’s no motion,

  Can there be a moving body?

  8

  The body that is moving has no motion in itself;

  And that which does not move is destitute of motion.

  Aside from what is moving and aside from what is motionless,

  What third thing is there that might move?

  9

  If, when destitute of motion,

  A moving body is untenable,

  How can it be tenable to say

  That moving bodies move?

  10

  Those for whom a moving body moves

  Must face the consequence that there can be

  A moving body without motion.

  For, they say, the moving body moves.

  11

  If a moving body moves,

  It follows that two motions are possessed by it.

  That by which it’s called a “moving body,”

  And that by which this moving body moves.

  12

  In “what has gone,” the motion does not start;

  And neither in the “not yet gone” does motion start.

  And if it does not start within the “act of going,”

  Where can motion be begun?

  13

  Before the start of movement,

  There’s no going where such motion can begin.

  Neither is it in the “having gone.”

  And how can it occur within the “not yet gone”?

  14

  If the start of motion

  Cannot be perceived in any way,

  What “having gone,” what “going”

  Or what “not yet gone” can be conceived?

  15

  A thing that’s moving now is not at rest;

  And an unmoving thing is not at rest.

  Apart from things that move and things that do not move,

  What third thing is there that might rest?

  16

  If a moving thing deprived of motion

  Cannot be accepted,

  How indeed is it acceptable to say

  That something moving is at rest?

  17

  Motion cannot be relinquished in the “act of going,”

  Neither in the “having gone” nor in the “not yet gone.”

  To move, to enter [into rest], and leave off from the same

  Are all the same as motion.

  18

  To say that motion and the moving body

  Are identical is incorrect.

  To say that motion and the moving body

  Are distinct is also incorrect.

  19

  If motion is itself

  The moving body,

  It follows that the agent

  And the action are identical.

  20

  If between the motion and the moving body

  A difference were to be discerned,

  Motion there would be without a moving body,

  And a moving body without motion.

  21

  If they are not established

  Either as the same

  Or else as different,

  How are these two established?

  22

  The motion due to which it’s called a “moving thing”

  Is not the motion whereby this thing moves.

  Since the moving body does not preexist its motion,

  What is it that moves, and where?

  23

  The motion due to which it’s called a “moving thing”—

  Apart from this, no other motion can it have.

  For in a single moving thing

  Two motions are untenable.

  24

  That which is a moving body does not move

  In any of the three ways mentioned.

  And what is not a moving body does not move

  In any of the three ways mentioned.

  25

  That which neither is a moving body nor is not a moving body

  Does not move in any of the three ways mentioned.

  Therefore motion and the moving body

  And the space through which they move are all without existence.

  3

  An Examination of the Sense Powers

  Sight and hearing, smell, the sense of taste,


  The sense of touch, and mind—

  The scope of these six faculties

  Are visible forms, and all the rest.1

  2

  The sense of sight

  Its own self does not see.

  And how can that which does not see itself

  See other things?

  3

  As means to prove that sight is real,

  The example of a fire is powerless.

  By “going, gone, and not yet gone”

  The example has been countered, seeing too.

  4

  When there is not the slightest seeing

  There can be no sight.

  How then can it be logical to say:

  “The sense of sight is that which sees”?

  5

  The seeing actually does not see

  And the unseeing likewise does not see.

  It should be understood that through the sense of sight,

  The seer too may be explained.

  6

  With seeing, there’s no seer;

  There’s no seer, either, without seeing.

  And if there is no seer,

  How can there be seeing and the seen?

  7

  Since there is no seeing

  And no object seen,

  The four links, consciousness, and so forth, don’t exist.2

  How can grasping and the rest exist?3

  8

  And through the sense of sight it should be understood

  That hearing, smell, and taste,

  The sense of touch and mind,

  The hearer and the heard are all explained.

  4

  An Examination of the Aggregates

  Separate from the cause of form,

  No form is found.

  Separate from a so-called form,

  The cause of form also does not appear.

  2

  If, separate from the cause of form,

  There were a form, this form would be by consequence

  Without a cause. But something that’s without a cause

  Is nowhere to be found.

  3

  If, separate from a form,

  There were a cause of form,

  This cause would be a cause without effect.

  But causes that have no effects do not exist.

  4

  If form exists,

  A cause of form is unacceptable.

  If form does not exist,

  The cause of form is likewise unacceptable.

  5

  Forms bereft of causes

  Are untenable, indeed they are!

  And thus concerning forms

  Conceive no concepts of whatever kind.

  6

  To say the fruit is like the cause

  Is unacceptable.

  To say the fruit’s unlike the cause

  Is also unacceptable.

  7

  With feelings and perceptions,

  Conditioning factors, consciousness,

  With all things, and in all respects,

  Apply the same procedure as with form.4

  8

  In arguments concerning emptiness,

  All statements made to counter it

  Are not replies at all.

  For they exemplify the thesis to be proved.

  9

  When emptiness is set forth and explained,

  All statements made to show its faults,

  Reveal no faults at all.

  For they exemplify the thesis to be proved.

  5

  An Examination of the Elements

  Previous to its own defining features

  Space does not exist, not even slightly.

  If it came before its own defining features,

  It follows that it’s featureless.

  2

  An entity devoid of features

  Can never have existence anywhere.

  If there is no thing that’s without features,

  To what can features then apply?

  3

  No features can apply to what is free of features

  Or to what possesses them.

  And yet aside from what has features or is featureless,

  They can apply nowhere else.

  4

  If features cannot be applied,

  A basis for the features is not tenable.

  And if a basis for the features is not tenable,

  No features, either, can there be.

  5

  And so there is no basis for such features;

  And features likewise have no being.

  Apart from features and the bases for the same,

  There are indeed no real existent things.

  6

  If things do not exist,

  Of what can there be nonexistence?

  And what is there that, being neither an existent nor a nonexistent thing,

  Can have cognizance of existence or nonexistence?

  7

  Therefore space is neither an existent nor a nonexistent thing;

  It’s not the basis for defining features, nor those very features.

  And the five remaining elements

  Are all the same as space.

  8

  Those of little wisdom—

  Those who think that things exist or that they don’t exist—

  Do not behold what should be seen:

  The peace that is the stilling [of all thought].

  6

  An Examination of Desire and the Desirous

  If before desire there exists,

  Without desire, a desiring agent,

  Desire exists dependent upon him.

  But where there are desiring agents, there must also be desire.

  2

  How, in the absence of an agent of desire,

  Can desire exist? And whether there’s desire or not,

  For agents of desire

  The argument is similar.5

  3

  Desire and agents of desire

  Cannot arise together and at once.

  For if desire and agent of desire arise in such a way,

  No relation can there be between them.

  4

  In identity there’s no coincidence

  For with themselves things do not coincide.

  And how, if there is separation,

  Can there ever be coincidence?

  5

  If in identity there is coincidence,

  It happens in the absence of a counterpart.

  And if in difference there’s coincidence,

  It happens too in absence of a counterpart.

  6

  If separate things can coincide,

  Are then desire and agent of desire

  Established as two separate things,

  Whereby the two can coincide?

  7

  If desire and agent of desire

  Are established as two separate things,

  Why should you consider them

  In terms of a coincidence?

  8

  If you claim they coincide,

  Because they’re not established as two separate things,

  Will you also claim that they are separate

  Because they are established as coincident?

  9

  Because as separate they are not established,

  They are not established as coincident.

  But then what separate things are there

  That cause you to discourse about coincidence?

  10

  And so desire and the desiring agent

  Do not exist together, neither do they not exist together.

  And all things, like desire,

  Do not exist together, neither do they not exist together.

  7

  An Examination of Arising, Abiding, and Decay

  If arising were compounded,

  It would have a threefold character.

  And were arising to be uncompounded, />
  How could it be a feature of compounded things?

  2

  Arising and abiding and decay, each one taken on its own,

  Cannot be the character of a compounded thing.

  And how at one time and within one thing

  Can it be right for them to coincide?

  3

  If arising and abiding and decay

  Display the character of compounded things,

  There is regression to infinity.

  If they do not have such features, they are uncompounded.

  4

  The arising of arising just gives rise, you say,

  To basic, root arising.

  This root arising then gives rise

  To the arising of arising.

  5

  If this root arising is engendered

  By what you call arising of arising,

  How does the latter, which the root arising

  Did not generate, give rise to it?

  6

  If the arising to which your root arising once gave rise

  Is that which gives rise to the root itself,

  How does this root, to which arising has not given rise,

  Give rise to this arising?

  7

  If that which has not been produced

  Were able to produce it,

  You could indeed affirm that this,

  As it arises, can give rise to that.

  8

  “Just as a flame illuminates [you say]

  Itself and other things,

  Arising likewise makes arise

  Itself and other things.”

  9

  In the flame and in its ambient space

  There is no darkness.

  What then does the flame illuminate?

  Illumination means to drive away the dark.

  10

  If the flame, when being kindled,

  Makes no contact with the dark,

  How can the kindling of a flame